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A fundamental assumption in the vast literature on optimal auction design is that agents'
final payoffs are determined solely by whether or not they obtain the auctioned good, and
by the payments made as required by the rules of the auction (see, for example, Myerson
(1981), and Milgrom and Weber (1982)). The possibility that the auctioned good might
play a role in future interaction among the auction's participants is excluded.
There are many situations, however, in which an auction's participants interact
after the close of the auction, and where the outcome of the auction affects the nature
of their future interaction. Buyers must take this into account when devising bidding
strategies; the seller must design the auction accordingly.
In particular, when a buyer does not obtain the object, he is no longer indiffer-
ent about the identity of the winner of the auction. Several illustrations are: changes of
ownership (such as mergers or privatizations) in oligopolistic markets; the sale of a patent
or of important inputs when there is downstream competition between buyers; the award
of major projects that lead to the creation of a new technology standard; the location of
environmentally hazardous enterprises such as waste management plants or nuclear reac-
tors; the location of a potentially powerful international organization such as the European
Central Bank.
The previous discussion suggests to us a model that differs from most of the
literature on optimal auction design, and more broadly, mechanism design problems in
two important aspects:
(1) To represent buyer i's payoff when buyer j gets the object, j = 1,... , N, buyer i is
characterized by an N-dimensional vector t' = (ti,... ,itN). As usual, the coordinate
ti can be thought of as his "private value", while each other coordinate tj can be
interpreted as his total payoff in the future interaction, or, say, as his losses caused by
pollution, when buyer j gets the object. We use the descriptive term "externalities"
to refer to these interaction terms. We are then confronted with a multidimensional
mechanism design problem.
(2) Since buyers will generally be unable to escape the effect of externalities simply by
refusing to participate in the auction, the agents' "reservation utilities" are neither
exogenously given, nor type-independent. Consider the event where a buyer refuses
to participate in the auction. In contrast to auctions without externalities, where
buyers' reservation values can be normalized to zero, when externalities are present, a
buyer's reservation value will, in effect, vary with both his type and the seller's action.
This paper studies the model of auctions with externalities, and while doing
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so develops techniques that we believe will be valuable in the understanding of other
mechanism design problems. We turn now to a brief survey of the most relevant literature,
before sketching out our line of attack.
Mechanism design problems arise naturally in numerous economic situations,
including the regulation of a monopolist, auctions, government procurement, nonlinear
pricing, and the provision of public goods. By and large, most of the vast literature has
been restricted to the case in which uncertainty is modelled by a single parameter, and
the commodity space has dimension two. In many problems, however, a satisfying analysis
demands a multidimensional treatment, but the technical difficulties have impeded our
progress.
There are many papers concerning multidimensional mechanism design problems.
Two strands of this literature are fairly well developed, the first studying nonlinear pric-
ing in multiproduct monopoly, and the second addressing the regulation of multiproduct
monopolists. Among the contributions to the former strand are: Champsaur and Rochet
(1989), Laffont, Maskin and Rochet (1987), McAfee, McMillan and Whinston (1989), Mir-
man and Sibley (1980), Palfrey (1983), Spence (1980), and Wilson (1991, 1993). Notable
contributions to the second strand include: Laffont and Tirole (1990), Lewis and Sapping-
ton (1988), and Rochet (1984). In addition to these papers, there are a few contributions
we would like to discuss because they concentrate on the development of general tools and
methods. They are: Armstrong (1992, 1993), Matthews and Moore (1987), McAfee and
McMillan (1988), and Rochet (1985, 1992).
McAfee and McMillan (1988) extend the notion of single crossing property (SCP)
to the case in which the utility function depends on m commodities, and is characterized by
n parameters, where m > 2, n > 1, and n> nm-1 (the standard SCP is defined for utility
functions that depend on two commodities and one parameter; thus their extension involves
both the commodity space and the parameter space). They show that for functions that
satisfy the SCP, a mechanism is incentive compatible if an envelope condition is satisfied.
They extend the "no-haggling" result of Riley and Zekhauser (1983) for the problem of a
monopolist selling three indivisible goods.
Matthews and Moore (1987) study a model with a three-dimensional commodity
space, and preferences characterized by a single parameter.
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They define a new SCP, in
type space rather than commodity space, and show that it coincides with the standard
SCP when the commodity space has dimension two. They also show that when the "con-
1 They work with a discrete type space. But the dimensionality of the type space is meaningful
because they insist on specific functional forms for the utility function.
tract set" associated with a mechanism is attribute-ordered (or monotone), and their SCP
is satisfied, the mechanism is incentive compatible if it satisfies the adjacent (or local)
incentive constraints. In the two-dimensional case, if the utility function satisfies the stan-
dard SCP, any mechanism that satisfies the adjacent incentive constraints will have an
attribute-ordered contract set, but this doesn't extend to higher dimensional commodity
spaces. They present a model similar to that of Mussa and Rosen (1978), with a three-
dimensional commodity space, and show that the optimal mechanism's contract set is
not attribute-ordered, and therefore that nonlocal incentive constraints are binding; both
results are at odds with their two-dimensional counterparts.
Rochet (1985) introduces a conjugate duality approach, and presents a very use-
ful characterization result for incentive compatible mechanisms. The analysis is restricted
to utility functions that are linear in their characteristic space. Although this is a severe
restriction, utility functions do exhibit the required linear property for many economic
models, including our auction problem. Rochet (1992) studies three models with linear
utility functions. The first is a multiproduct monopolist problem similar to that studied
by McAfee and McMillan (1988) and McAfee, McMillan and Whinston (1988); he shows
that, contrary to one-dimensional models, for some choices of parameters, all participation
constraints are binding at the optimal mechanism, and the seller extracts all the infor-
mational rents. The second is an extension of the Mussa and Rosen (1978) model to the
case in which the product has n attributes and consumers' tastes are characterized by
n parameters (their marginal value for each attribute). Rochet demonstrates that in an
optimal mechanism, upward as well as downward incentive constraints are binding.
The recent work of Armstrong (1992, 1993), in addition to using conjugate du-
ality (and the characterization results of Rochet (1985)), employs the divergence theorem
to construct a method for the design of optimal mechanisms. His method resembles very
closely that of Myerson (1979), Myerson (1981), and Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) for
the one-dimensional characteristic space. The divergence theorem is the multidimensional
analog of integration by parts. Armstrong is able to reduce substantially the complexity
of the underlying optimization problem, and to obtain solutions in closed form for classes
of problems that satisfy certain regularity conditions. In Armstrong (1992) he studies a
multiproduct monopolist pricing problem, and in Armstrong (1993) he investigates the
optimal regulation of a multiproduct monopolist.
We view our paper as a contribution to the set of new tools being developed to
deal with multidimensional mechanism design problems. In particular, we extend the use
of conjugate duality and the divergence theorem to multiagent problems with externalities.
The formulation and simplification of the mechanism design problem is carried
2 3
out in four major steps (roughly corresponding to Sections 2 through 5). We invoke the
revelation principle to formulate the design problem in terms of two functions on the space
of type profiles: the probability assignment function, determining the random mechanism
to be used for assigning the object to a player, and the payment function specifying the
transfer from each buyer to the seller. We then use conjugate duality to derive necessary
and sufficient conditions for a mechanism to be incentive compatible, similar to the envelope
condition for one-dimensional mechanism design problems. This characterization result
allows us to state the seller's problem in a relatively compact format. As is usually done
in the one-dimensional case, the envelope condition is used to eliminate half the variables
(the payment function) in the problem.
The participation constraints involve an additional problem, not present in an
auction without externalities. In one dimensional mechanism design problems, the partic-
ipation constraints bind only for the "lowest" type. But, as the results in Rochet (1992)
suggest, this need not be the case in multidimensional problems. Moreover, in our auction
problem, the buyers' reservation values are endogeneous. Thus, we must also construct
optimal "threats" to provide incentives for the buyers to participate in the auction. The
design of optimal threats is intertwined with the identification of the region where the par-
ticipation constraints bind. We have identified a symmetric setting for which the seller's
problem has a symmetric optimal solution. For symmetric auctions, the participation
constraint binds only for the "lowest" type of every buyer, and each buyer is induced to
participate by the threat that otherwise the object will be assigned randomly to one of his
opponents.
The seller's problem has a rather complex objective function, involving for each
buyer, both the conditional expected probability assignment function and its antideriva-
tive. The divergence theorem simplifies the complicated optimization problem at hand, by
reducing the objective function to an expression that depends on the probability assign-
ment function only. The divergence theorem plays the same role as integration by parts in
the one-dimensional case. If a certain boundary condition is satisfied, the seller's objective
function reduces to the expected value of the inner product of an "index function" with
the probability assignment function. With the exception of two constraints, the seller's
problem can be viewed as a linear programming problem. One of these constraints is the
analog of the standard monotonicity condition in one-dimensional mechanism design prob-
lems. If we relax these conditions, the relaxed problem is extremely easy to solve, and a
solution can be obtained by simple pointwise maximization.
We finally.study the relaxed problem. The index function includes terms that
are obtained as the solution of certain partial differential equations. These terms are not
uniquely defined because the boundary conditions are not fully specified. We use this de-
gree of freedom to symmetrize the index function. When the index function is symmetric,
the relaxed problem also admits a symmetric optimal solution, and the participation con-
straints bind only at the origin. Obviously, if the solution satisfies the relaxed constraints,
then it is also the seller's optimal solution. Myerson (1981) identifies a "regularity condi-
tion" on the hazard rate of the buyers' distributions for the independent and private values
auction problem. This condition guarantees that the solution of a relaxed problem, similar
to ours, is the optimal solution of the seller's problem. Moreover, for problems that do not
satisfy the regularity condition, he has a method to modify the objective function so that
the problem satisfies the regularity condition, and the solution of its relaxed problem still
is the seller's optimal solution. We have not yet found its multidimensional counterpart.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the model and the seller's op-
timization problem. In Section 3 we introduce the symmetric setting, and establish results
that greatly simplify the participation constraints. In Section 4, we use the divergence
theorem to transform the seller's objective function. We symmetrize the index function in
Section 5, and present examples in Section 6.
2. THE MODEL
There are N buyers, indexed by i = 1,..., N, and a seller, designated as player i = 0. We
will refer to the "players" when we want to include the seller, and to the "buyers" when
we want to exclude her, although the seller is not a player of the auction game. Hence, we
let Io := {0, 1,..., N} be the set of players, and I := {1,..., N} be the set of buyers.
The seller owns a single unit of an indivisible object.
To represent buyer i's externalities, we assume that his type is an N-dimensional
vector2 ti = (t,.. t s), where tj is buyer i's payoff when buyer j gets the object. We
focus here on the case of negative externalities, that is, on the situation in which any
potential buyer perceives a positive payoff when he obtains the object, and a negative
payoff when anybody else gets it (vis-a-vis the case where the seller keeps the object). The
seller has an analogous type represented by the N-dimensional vector to. Buyer i's type is
drawn from Ti := (bo, bi1
1 x [ao, ai) x (bo, b1]N-i, where b1  0 and ao > 0, according
with the density fi, and is independent of all other players' types. Thus, the probability
that the buyers' types are given by the N-tuple (t
1
,..., tN) E T := T1 x ... X TN is
2 In a richer model, we could assume that player i's type is represented by an (N+ 1)-dimensional
vector (to, ti,...,it), where to represents his payoff when the seller keeps the object. Part of the analysis
would apply to this model as well. However, the characterization results of Sections 3 and 4 below for
symmetric settings do not extend to the richer model.
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f(t) := f 1(t
1
) x ... x fN(tN). We allow for the possibility that bo = -oo and/or a1 = +oo.
We assume that f,(t') > 0 for all ti E Ti. The "origin" (or "upper-left" corner) of Ti is
denoted by O := (b1 ,...,b1,ao,b1,...,b1).
Buyers' types are private information: buyer i knows his own type but he doesn't
know anybody else's. The seller's type can be made publicly known. Although the seller's
type is revealed (partially) through the choice of the auction mechanism, this information
does not affect the buyers' expected payoffs.
Buyer i's utility is additively separable: if he pays xi to the seller and player
j gets the object, his utility is tj - xi, where tp := 0. In general, a buyer's payment
need not be zero even if he doesn't get the object The seller's utility is also additively
separable: if buyer i pays her xi, i E I, and she gives the object to player j, her utility is
t +zi +"---+zN, where to :=0.
We are concerned with the design of an auction that maximizes revenue for the
seller. By the Revelation Principle, there is no loss of generality in restricting attention
to direct revelation mechanisms where each buyer reports a type. Moreover, it is enough
to consider mechanisms that are incentive compatible and that satisfy the participation
constraints, that is, mechanisms for which it is a Bayesian equilibrium for each buyer
to report his type truthfully. Since a buyer cannot be forced to "participate" in the
auction, "nonparticipation" must be included among his possible reports. Let E := {q E
R+N| qi < 1} be the set of probability vectors; the coordinate qi of a probability vector q
represents the probability that buyer i gets the object, while 1 - EN 1 qi represents the
probability that the seller keeps the object. The seller specifies the rules of the auction
in terms of a revelation mechanism (p, x,p), where p = (pi,... , pN) E N is a profile of
N probability vectors, xi : T -+ R, i e I, and p : T -+ E. The seller asks each of the
buyers simultaneously to report a type. If all buyers submit a type and the report profile
is (t t,... ,tN) ET, buyer i must pay the seller x;(t1 , . ,tN), and he gets the object with
probability p,(t1,..., tN). If buyer i refuses to participate in the auction while all other
buyers submit a report, the object is given to buyer j with probability pj, j E J,3 and
no buyer makes a payment to the seller. If two or more buyers refuse to submit a report,
then, say,4 the seller keeps the object with probability 1 and nobody makes any payments.
3 The probability vector p' is designed to "punish" buyer i when he refuses to report his type.
Since t) <;0 for all j 9 i and t = 0, the threat is more severe when the seller reduces the probability
of keeping the object and/or the probability of giving the object to buyer i. Therefore, without loss of
generality, we will require that for each buyer i, pi = 0 and 1 - Ejj1 p! = 0.
4 We study the Nash equilibria of the game, and disregard the possibility of coalition formation.
Hence, profitable multiple deviations are irrelevant. If the domain of the function p were extended to
include profiles where some players report "nonparticipation", then the vectors p' could be included as
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Suppose player i believes everybody else reports truthfully. Then, to assess the
expected value of any of his reports, he only needs to know the conditional expected value,
given his own type, of his payment and the probability assignment vector. Define then the
functions y; : T; - R and qi : Ti -+ E as follows:
yi(t*) := zg(t', ... , tN f-igg)d-i
g (t') := P (t1, ... ,tN f-ig-it
We will refer to these functions as buyer i's conditional expected payment and conditional
expected probability assignment in the mechanism (p, x, p). If buyer i believes his opponents
will report truthfully, and reports type s' when his type is t', his expected utility is
U(s', t') := q'(s') - t' - y;(s').
The auction mechanism (p, x, p) is said to be incentive compatible for buyer i if
U(t', tl) > U(si, ti) for all s', t' E T;,
and to satisfy the participation constraints for buyer i if
U;(t',t') 2 p' - t' for all t* E T,.
The right hand side of the last inequality is buyer i's expected value when he doesn't make
any payments to the seller, and the seller assigns the object randomly according with the
probability vector pi. The auction mechanism is feasible if it is incentive compatible and
satisfies the participation constraints for every buyer.
Clearly, if (p,x,p) is a feasible mechanism, so is (p,x,p), where E,(t): y(t')
for all t e T. Moreover, with x the buyers expect to make the same payment to the seller
as with x. Thus, there is no loss of generality in restricting attention to mechanisms for
which the payment of each player depends only on his own report. Consequently, we will
specify below auction mechanisms directly in terms of (p, y, p).
The seller wants to maximize total expected revenue plus the expected value of
her externality. Therefore her problem is
N
(P) max J y,(ti)f,(t')dt' + p(t) . t0f(t)dt
i=1 7, JT
s.t. incentive compatibility and participation constraints.
part of the definition of p. We have chosen the domain T mainly to simplify the notation below; in an
honest equilibrium, no player reports "nonparticipation".
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Suppose that there are two types s and t' such that '(s') = q'(t') and
y;(s') > y;(t'). If buyer i is of type ai and believes everybody else reports truthfully, he
would strictly prefer to report ti than to report s', and truthtelling would not be incentive
compatible. Therefore, for any incentive compatible mechanism, the "contract surface"
C; := { (q'(t'), y;(t'))| t' E Ti') C RN+1 for buyer i intersects any vertical line (in the last
coordinate) at most once, and hence is also defined explicitly by a function ) : E -4R,
where f = R U (+oo) is the extended real line. That is, C, = { (q, Y(q)) I q E E } and
y;(t') = K(g(t )).
Buyer i's surplus function S;,: T - R is the conjugate of the function Yi:
S,(t') := sup { q- t' - Yi(q) I q E E }.
This optimization problem determines buyer i's optimal report decision when he is pre-
sented with the "menu" Ci and his type is t'. Various properties of Si are readily available
and have been previously recorded by Armstrong (1992) and Rochet (1985) (for a general
reference on conjugate duality and properties of convex functions, the reader should consult
the classical books by Rockafellar (1972, 1974)). S; is convex, continuous, and monoton-
ically increasing. Let 8S;(t') denote the subdifferential of Si at t'. Then q E DS;(t') if q
attains the sup in the definition of S,(ti), that is, if q E E and Si(t) = q"t' -Y(q). Thus,
(p, y, p) is incentive compatible for buyer i if q'(ti') E DS,(ti) for all t' E Ti and
y;(ti) = Y;(q'(ti)) = q'(t') . t' - S;(ti).
Moreover, since Si is convex, Si is differentiable almost everywhere, and if Si is differen-
tiable at tI', S(ti') = {VS(ti')}. Thus q'(ti') = VS,(t) almost everywhere in Ti.
The property that q'(t') E DS(ti') for every ti E T is the familiar "envelope con-
dition". Let (p, y,p) be an incentive compatible auction mechanism. If S; is differentiable
at ti', we have
dS;i dDi B;,; _-d (ti) = d (ti, ti) = 8t') 
i .iti i=e'~q71 )
Since Si is differentiable and VS(ti) = qi(ti) almost everywhere,
S(t') = S;(s')+j q'(r)- dr for all s', t' E Ti.
The integral in the right hand side is a line integral, which does not depend on the specific
path from s' to t'. That is, the vector field q' must be conservative.
5 The following
5 A vector field (or function) p : RN .. RN is conservative if it is the gradient of a function
4 RN -+ R. If p is differentiable, t' is conservative if Oi /O-j ,= 9j/87i for all i 9 j.
proposition summarizes these results. They are stated in terms of the potential function
Q,(t') := S(t i)-S,(0), where S(O')= q'(O')-OQ'-y;(O). The term gq(O')-O' appears
numerous times, and will be denoted by z(Oi) (obviously, it depends on p).
PROPOSITION 1: Consider the auction mechanism (p, y, p), and let qi, i E I, be
the corresponding conditional probability assignment functions. Then,
(1) The mechanism is incentive compatible for buyer i iff the vector field q :T, ; RN
is conservative, the potential function Qi : Ti -+ R, defined by
Qi(t') := q'(s') - ds' for each t'e ET
is convex, and
y;(t') = qi(ti) -i - Q(t') + yi(O') - z,(O') for each t' E T;.
(2) The mechanism satisfies the participation constraints for buyer i if
Qi(t') - y,(O') + z;(O'). p'i -t for all ti' E Ti.
Note that the potential function Q, is well defined when qi is conservative, and is
nondecreasing in each of its arguments because q*(i*), being a probability vector, is always
nonnegative. The condition that Q, be convex is equivalent to the condition that q* be
monotone. The function q is monotone if for every si, t' E Ti, (ai - ti) - (gi(si) - gi(ti)) >
0. This is the standard extension to vector-valued functions of the familiar notion of
monotonicity for real-valued functions.
Part (1) of Proposition 1 states that for incentive compatible mechanisms, the
expected payment function y; is uniquely determined by V(i) and the probability assign-
ment function p. Therefore it can be eliminated from the seller's design problem, as it is
usually done in one-dimensional mechanism design problems.
By Proposition 1, if the auction is incentive compatible, the seller expects an
average payment from buyeri equal to
yi(t') fi(t')dt1 = (q'(t') - t* - Qi(t) + yi(O*) -- z;(O*)) fi(t)dt'.
Let y(O) (y1(O1),..., yN(ON)), z(O) := (z1(0
1),... ,zN(ON)), and for later use as
well, let e (1, ... , 1) E RN. The seller's problem is then
N
(P) max _ f(q(ti).- i - Qi(t')) f;(t')dt' + fp(t) -tuf(t)dt + e- (y(O) - z(0))
s.t. Qi(t') - yi(Oi) + zO') p s' 1 rE 7', i El
q' is a monotone and conservative field, i E I.
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Obviously, the seller would like to maximize y(Oi) for each buyer i. However, the par-
ticipation constraints set an upper bound on y(O'). Given a probability assignment
function p and a probability vector pi, buyer i's participation constraints are satisfied if
y,(O') < z,(O') - Q:(p'), where
Qt(p,):= sup [p' -t - Qi(ti)]
tI'ET
(Qi denotes the conjugate function of Q; in the convex sense.) Optimally, the seller chooses
y;(O') = z,(O') - Q?(p), and the seller's objective function becomes
p(t) (tO +.- + tN)ifi(t)dt -NN
T=1T s-1
In the next section we study a symmetric case, for which we can find p and y(O)
explicitly.
3. SYMMETRY AND THE PARTICIPATION CONSTRAINTS
The seller's problem has a rather large and complex set of constraints. Similarly to the
techniques used to solve one-dimensional mechanism design problems, we will relax the
last two constraints. Concerning the participation constraints, we will prove below that
for a class of symmetric problems, it is enough to check these constraints at the origin.
Note that since Q,(O') = 0 by definition, buyer i's participation constraint at the origin
is equivalent to y;(O') < z,(O') - b1 . For general problems (symmetric or otherwise), it
is sufficient to verify the participation constraints at the "upper" boundary of every type
set. The upper boundary of Ti is the set of points ti in Ti for which t'i+ ae 0 T; for any
a > 0.
LEMMA 1: Suppose the auction mechanism (p, y, p) is incentive compatible.
Then, for each i, the potential function Q, satisfies the inequality Qi(ti + ae) Qi(t')+a
for each ti e Ti and a E R. such that ti + ae E Ti.
PROOF: Since VQi(t') = qi(t
t




PROPOSITION 2: Suppose the auction mechanism (p, y,p) is incentive compat-
ible. IfI(p, y,p) satisfies the participation constraints at the upper boundary of T, then
(p, y,p) satisfies the participation constraints everywhere in T.
PROOF: Suppose that the mechanism (p, y, p) satisfies the participation con-
straints at the upper boundary, and consider a type t' not on the upper boundary of
Ti. There exists a type s' at the upper boundary of T and a scalar a > 0 such that
ti = s' - ae. Therefore, since p'i- e = 1,
Qi(t') - y;(O ) + z;(O') Q(s') - y(O') + z(Oi) - a 2 pi .si - a = p' .ti. *
A permutation of I is any bijection it: I -+ I. A permutation i fixes i if ir(i) = i.
The set of all permutations is denoted by 4, and 4'i denotes the set of all permutations
that fix i. For each permutation it of I, we define the function H : RN -+ RN as follows:
11(r) := (Tr-(i),... ,rT1 -1(N)) for each T E RN.
Let rir be the simple permutation that switches the indices i and j: rir(i) = j,
n;ir(j) = i, and 7rir(k) = k for all k f {i, j}, and let 1ij : RN _+ RN be the corresponding
map switching coordinates i and j. Clearly, rir = iri;; this observation is used repeatedly
below. Any permutation of I can be decomposed into simple permutations. For t E (RN)N,
II(t) will denote the profile of vectors (s1,... , 8N), where
s-= =Hij(t") for all k # {i,j},
Si = Iig(t'), and s9 = flH(ti).
Note that in this profile fly(t') is in the j-th position, while 1lH(t) is in the i-th. Let it be
any permutation of I, and suppose it can be obtained as the composition irgo 1k o. ---o n
of simple permutations. Then, W* : (RN)N _> (RN)N denotes the function obtained as
the composition His, o Hl o -"--"o11T*,.
For the rest of the paper, we confine attention to symmetric settings that satisfy
the following properties:
(Si) t = t, for all i, j EI.
(52) for each i E I, type t', and permutation ir that fixes i, f,(fl(ti)) = f;(ti).
(S3) for any i # j and type t', f,(ti) = f (Hay(ti)).
Condition (Si) says that no matter which buyer gets the object, the seller suffers
the same externality. (S2) states that the probabilities that buyer i is of type t' and that
buyer i is of another type equal to t' but with coordinates j and k (where j # i and k # i)
switched, are the same. Finally, (S3) says that types for each player are drawn from the




The mechanism (p, y,p) is symmetric for buyer i if for each permutation w E Ii,
(1) p=0Oandp=- for all j#i.
(2) y;,(H(t')) = y;(ti), for all t' E T;.
(3) q'(IH(ti)) = fl(q'(t')), for all t' E T.
We will say that the function q' is symmetric if it satisfies condition (3) above, and that
p is symmetric if each q' is symmetric.
Condition (3) says that if buyer i's report were changed from ti to si, where si
is the vector ti with coordinates j # i and k # i switched, then player i's conditional
probabilities of assigning the object to players j and k would be switched while all other
assignment probabilities remain the same. Part (1) of Proposition 1 implies that if (p, y, p)
is incentive compatible and q' is symmetric, then y, must satisfy condition (2) above.
Lemma 2 below shows that the following condition implies that p is symmetric.
For each profile t = (t1,..., tN), when buyers j and k trade places, each player's probability
of getting the object is unaffected. That is, p;(Hllg(t)) = p(t) for each i different from j
and k, and py(Hy&(t)) = pk(t) and pk(flk(t)) = p,(t). Recall that for a player i different
from j and k, the i-th vector in the profile IIak(t) has entries j and k switched. Roughly
then, since players j and k have the "same" probability distribution over types, player i's
expected probability assignment vector is the same when his type is Ha(ti) as when his
type is t'.
LEMMA 2: Suppose p : T -+ E has the property that for every simple permuta-
tion way with i < j, and every t E T, p(lH,(t)) = fJ11 (p(t)). Then p is symmetric.
PROOF: Since a permutation it that fixes i can be decomposed into simple
permutations that never move i, to prove that p is symmetric, it is enough to check that
for any three different indices i, j, and k, q'(flya(ti)) = flja(g(t')) for all ti' E Ti.
Let t E T and i, j, and k be three different indices. We have
q'(Hlk(t')) = f p(HII(t'),t-')f-(t-') dt-i
= p(Hjkat) f_;%,(W ~)-dt-
That is, for any two (p, y,p) and (p, y, p) satisfying the constraints of problem (P), and
any A E (0,1), the triple A(p,y,p) + (1 - A)(p,y,p) also satisfies the constraints of (P)
(including the constraint that for each i, Aq' + (1 - A))' is a monotone and conservative
field). Moreover, the objective function of (P) is linear in p and y(O), and thus its value at
A(p, y, p) + (1 - A)(p, y, p) is equal to the convex combination of its values at (p, y, p) and
(p, y, p). This observations are used in the following proposition to construct a symmetric
optimal mechanism.
PROPOSITION 3: Suppose the setting is symmetric. Then, for any feasible auc-
tion mechanism (p, y, p) there exists a symmetric auction mechanism (p, y, p) which is
feasible and gives the seller the same expected revenue.
PROOF: Suppose (p, y, p) is a feasible auction mechanism. We now construct a
symmetric mechanism (p,y, p) as follows: p; = 0 and P= - for all j$ 9i,
N
P (t) := 1I 3E p,(H* o Hj(t)) k = 1,..., N, I E T,
j=1wE.,
and y;(t') := i4(t') - t - Qi(t') + yo for each i = 1,..., N and t' E Ti, where yo
k iN1(yYj(O') - z,(O). Clearly, p(t) > 0, for all I E T, and for any j,
{WI*|xrE$}={I* oHjI|re$ 3 , and k= 1,...,N).
Therefore, for each t E T,
N N
S= p3 (y(t)) = 1.
k=1 wEj=1
Tedious but simple computations show that for each i 4 j, (W,*(t)) = H1,y(p(t)) for each
t E T. Hence, by Lemma 2, p is symmetric.
Fix i; we have that
1N





But, for any k (in particular for i), the collection of sets
{lolray |rE$,} j=1,...,N
= j lk(p(t)) f-;(rj;(t)-') dt-'
= j 1a(p(t)) f_;(t-') dt-i
= Hya(q'(t'))
(by assumption)
(by (S2) and (S3 ))
I
It is easy to see that the set of feasible triples (p, y, p) for problem (P) is convex.
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is a partition of 4; the set for a given j contains all the permutations that send k to
j. Therefore, for each j and k, and each 7r E 4b,, there exists I and W E 4, such that
* o xir =r o 7rk,. Moreover, * o x ir(i) = 1, and also j = 7r o rk(k) = * o 7ri(k). Hence
N
if(t ) = i q*o 1(k)(fo Hit)(N)
1=1 *EO
and




Qi(ts) = 11 Q3(flo113 3(t')).
j=1 wE-0,
Since the mechanism satisfies the participation constraints for each player, we
have that for each j and 7r E 4,,
Q3(fl o H;(ti)) - y,(O') + z3(O') p' .I Ho I,;,(ti) = 11i, o H-
1
(p') -ti.
It is easy to see that
N1)! and fli,(P)=7i'.
(N 1''wEt,
Hence, (p, y, p) satisfies the participation constraints:
N
Q(t1) - y o > -i1 ti = P - ti,
N3=1
If g, h : Ti -+ RN are two monotone and conservative vector fields, then Ag + jph
is also a monotone and conservative vector field for all A, p > 0. Therefore, part (1) of
Proposition 1 implies that (p, y, p) satisfies the incentive compatibility constraints. Finally,
the objective function of the seller evaluated at p and y(0) is just the average over all
permutations 7r E 4 of the objective function evaluated at each 11(p) and H(y(O)). But,
the value of the objective function at 11(p) and H(y(0)) is the same as the value at p and
y(O). Therefore, the symmetric mechanism (p, y, p) gives the seller the same expected
revenue as (p, y, p). 1
Proposition 3 implies that there is an optimal solution (p,p,p) of problem (P)
which is symmetric. Therefore, the seller can restrict attention to symmetric auction
mechanisms without any loss in expected revenue.
PROPOSITION 4: Let (p, y, p) be any incentive compatible auction mechanism
such that for a given i, pi satisfies the requirements of footnote 3, q' is symmetric, and
buyer i's participation constraint at the origin is satisfied: y(O') < zi(O') - b1. Then
(p, y, p) satisfies all the participation constraints for player i.
PROOF: We will show that if the mechanism violates the participation constraint
for a buyer i at a point other than the origin, then it also violates the participation con-
straint for buyer i at the origin. We only study the case in which i = 1. Suppose that t1
is such that Q1(t
1) - yi(O') + z1(O
1) < pl - t1. Consider the sequence of N - 1 vectors
t1 ',ti, 2,..., t,N-1 obtained from t' by sequentially rotating its coordinates 2,...,N,







, t1,2: (ti,t3, ... ,tt2),...,t1,N-1.
(ti, tN, t2, ... , tN._1 ). Since q is symmetric, Q,(t') = Q,(t) for all k, and since pl -tlik =
p
l .t1, the participation constraint .is violated for each tA'*. Define
,1 1= N. _ Ztl' = (ti,a,...,a), where a := < bl.
N -1 .N - 1E
Since Qi is convex,
Q,(81) - 21(01) + zO1 ) _< N - 1 E [Q(tl'k) - y1O) + zi(0 1 )]
k
SN 1 1
Hence, the participation constraint is violated at sl. Let r1 := si - (a - bi)e = (ti -
a + b1, bi,..., b1 ). By Lemma 1, ri also violates the participation constraint: Qi(ri) -
y1(01) +zi(O1) _<Q1(sl) -(a -bi) -yi(01)+ zi(O ) < pi-si -(a - bi)=pl -rl = b1
(the last two equalities attain because EN1 p} = 1 and pi =0). Finally, since Qi is
monotone and bi - a > 0, yi(0') - zi(0 1 ) > Qi(r1 ) - bi > Qi(0) - bi = -bi; this is a
contradiction. I
Proposition 4 shows that for any incentive compatible auction mechanism (p, y, p)
for which qi is symmetric, the participation constraints of buyer i bind only at the origin.
But, the reservation value of a buyer i with type 0' is b1, regardless of how p' is chosen, as
long as p' satisfies the assumptions of footnote 3. So, for any p' satisfying these assump-
tions, if q' is symmetric and y,(O') - z1(01) < -bi, (p, y,p) satisfies all the participation
constraints for player i (that is, we don't really need condition (1) in the definition of a
symmetric mechanism).
The seller wants to choose y,(0') as large as possible, but the participation
constraint for buyer i at the origin requires that y;(Oi) z=(0) - bi. Hence, the seller
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will optimally set y(O') = z(O') - bi. Buyer i's payment to the seller can be decomposed
into two terms: an entry fee, represented by y(O'), and a transfer q'(t')-"t' - Q,(t') - z(O')
required to increase buyer i's chances of getting the object and/or to decrease the chances
that harmful opponents get the object. In general, the latter could be negative, in which
case the principal returns money to the buyer. However, each buyer's net payment in an
optimal symmetric auction is always positive.
PROPOSITION 5: In a symmetric optimal auction, no buyer is ever subsidized by
the seller.
PROOF: . Consider the straight path from O' to t' defined by h(x) := O' +
x(t'-O'), xE (0,1]. For each t' E T, we have
q'(t') - t' - Qi(t') = 9'(t') -0' + (q'(t') - q'(h(x))) - (t' - 0') dx,
and since qi is monotone, (q'(t')-q'(h(x))).(t'-O') = 1 (q'(ti)-qi(h(x))).(ti-h(x)) > 0
for each x E (0,1). Therefore,
y,(t') = y(O') - z(0') + q'(t') . t' - Qi(t')
> -b1 + q'(t') -0' = qi(t')(ao - b1) >0.
In a symmetric setting, the seller's problem reduces to
N
(P) max p(t) -(t0 +--. + tN)f(t)dt - F Q(t')f,(t')dt' - Nbi
P iT i=1 J
s.t. p : T -*E
q' is a monotone and conservative field, i E I.
A standard technique to construct solutions of one-dimensional mechanism de-
sign problems is to relax the monotonicity constraint. Let (R) denote the relaxed problem
obtained from (P) when all constraints, except that requiring that p(T) C E, are dropped.
A similar argument to that of Proposition 3 shows that (R) has a symmetric optimal solu-
tion. Moreover, if p is any solution of (R) such that qi is a monotone and conservative field
for each i, then a symmetric solution p of (R) can be constructed so that q is monotone
and conservative for each i. Suppose 7 is a symmetric solution of (R) that satisfies these
constraints, and let (p, y, p) be the auction mechanism where for each i E I, Pi := 0,
, = for all j 0 i, and y;(t') := q (t').t' -Q,(t')- bi for each t' E Ti. Then, (7,75,75)
is an optimal auction mechanism.
4. THE DIVERGENCE THEOREM
We now simplify the objective function of the seller's problem. We use the divergence
theorem and adapt the techniques of Armstrong (1993) to deal with the seller's problem.
Let ' : Rk -+ Rk be a continuously differentiable vector field. The divergence
of % is the function div ' : Rk -+ R defined by
div'(r):= -- (r).
If U is a bounded region in Rk having a piecewise smooth boundary 9U, the divergence
theorem asserts that
div 'dV = ' -"dS,
where dS denotes the surface element, and is equal to n dz (n denotes the unitary exterior
normal vector of the boundary 8U, and da is the surface area differential). The divergence
theorem also holds in some cases for which U is unbounded. For example, if U = [0,+oo)k,
the divergence theorem is valid, provided that
R*oo s( R) 9'-dS=0,
where S(R) is the intersection of the sphere of radius R and center at the origin with the
positive orthant.
Let F' : RN -+ RN be a solution of the differential equation div F' = fi in T.
Then, div (QFi) = VQ, -Fi + Qifi, and the divergence theorem implies that
Qifidt' = - VQ; -F'dt'+ f QiF' dS.
J; J; JT;
Therefore,
(9'(t ) - t' - Qi(t')) fi(t )dt' = q'(t') - (ti + F t)lfi(t')dt' - QiF' - d5.
If over a portion of the boundary 0T;, the vector field Fi is orthogonal to BTi,
while over its complement, Qi is 0, the surface integral in the right hand side would be
0. The partial differential equation div F' = f, does not determine a unique solution; to
specify a unique solution one can, for example, impose boundary conditions of the form
F' -n = g on OTi, where g is a real-valued function defined on the boundary 8T. '1rying
to make the surface integral equal to 0, one would like to choose g = 0. However, this is
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not possible: by the divergence theorem, the function g can be chosen arbitrarily, provided
it satisfies the constraint
J gdcr=f fidV= 1.
In some cases it is possible to construct a solution of div F' = f, in Ti such that F'.n = 0
almost everywhere on 07'i. But such a solution will necessarily have singularities on 8Ti.
For each buyer i pick a solution F' of div F' = f, and define the index function
(:T -+ RN by
[(t):= to + t' + f(t) t E T.
i1 f' ( )
The seller's objective function then becomes
N
IT .p(t)dt - QF'-dS-Nb,.
A strategy for solving problem (R) is to solve the modified (and relaxed) problem
(M) max JT((t) -p(t)dt.
This problem is extremely simple and a solution can be constructed directly by taking
p(t) E arg max { ((t) -q | q E E } for each t E T. If
J Q;F* dS = 0 for each i E I,
then p is also a solution of problem (R).
5. SYMMETRIZATION OF THE INDEX FUNCTION
In this Section we show that for symmetric settings, the index function t defined in Section
4 can be chosen to be symmetric. When the index function is symmetric, problem (M)
has an optimal solution that is symmetric. The index function is constructed in terms
of Fi, where F' solves the linear differential equation div F' = fi, i = 1,... , N. Fix i
and suppose div F' = fi. If f,(H1yk(t')) = f;(t') for all t' E Ti, j 0 i and k $ i, then
div (flk o F' o Il ) = f0i o ,j = fi for all j # i and k $ i. Thus, any convex combination
of {Hak oF'o IIk Ij # i,k $ i} solves the same partial differential equation as F. Also, for
symmetric settings, any solution of the partial differential equation for i = 1 composed with
the permutation LIj, gives a solution of the equation for j $ 1. Lemmas 3 and 4 below
use these facts to construct solutions to these equations that satisfy certain symmetry
properties.
LEMMA 3: Let i E I, g : RN -+ R satisfy g(11(r)) = g(r) for all r and
permutation it E 4'3, and G : RN _4 RN be such that divG = g. Define
G*(r) := (N -1)! Z (G(II(r))) for each r.
Then, divG* = g, and G*(H(r)) = 1(G*(r)) for all r and permutation it E 41'.
PROOF: To avoid complex notation, let us give the proof for the case N = 3 and
i= 1. We have that
Gi(r) = (GI(r)+ Gi(r,r 3 , 2 ))/2
G2(r) = (G 2 (r) + G3(71,7 3 ,T 2 ))/2
G;(r) = (G3 (r)+ G2 (ri, 3 ,r 2 ))/2.
Therefore,
G 1 rG1 8G1 1
8 T 
T 1 & G 1 8 G 2 8 G 3a 3 T 2 nOr 2) = (r)+ -(r, 3 ,2) ,an
8G3 =1 8G3 8G2
T3 (r)=2 ([G(r) + 82(r, 3, 2) a
Ora '2 Bra Or
and thus div G*(r) = [div G(r) + div G(ri,r 3 ,rT2)]/2 = [g(r) + g(r,,r 3 ,r 2)]/2 = g(r). It is
also easy to see that G*(11 2 3(r)) =H 2 3(G*(r)).
Under assumption (S2 ), Lemma 3 asserts that if div F' = fi admits a solution,
then there is a solution F' that has the additional property that F'(H(t')) = fl(Fi(ti))
for all ti and permutation it that fixes i.
LEMMA 4: Assume (S2) and (S3) are satisfied and let F' be such that divF' =
fl and F1(11(t1)) = 1(F'(tI)) for all t1 and permutation it that fixes 1. For each i > 1,
define F'(t') := F'(fi(t')), ti E Ti. Then, for each i > 1, divF' = fi and F'(II(t')) =
fl(F'(t')) for all ti and permutation 7r that fixes i.
Lemmas 3 and 4 can be used to construct a symmetric index function, and for a
symmetric index function, problem (M) has a symmetric optimal solution.
LEMMA 5: Assume (Si)-(S3 ) are satisfied and let F1 be such that div F1 = f1
and F'(1(t')) = H(F'(t')) for all t' and permutation 7r E 41. For each i > 1, let
Fi(ti) := F(fh(t')), t' E T. Then, the index function
i(t) = to + (ti + Fi(t) f(t) t E T
4=1 f;(t )
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satisfies: t(I,(t)) = Hi,3(((t)) for all t E T and # j.
PROOF: Conditions (S2) and (S3) imply that f(n,(t)) = f(t) for all E T,
and Ek nty)k = fi,( (l> tk). For all k # {i,j}, Fk(I,(t)k) = IIi,(Fk(tk)). More-
over Fi(ll, 3(t)') = Fi(fl. (ti)) = F'(HI(I y(t'))) = Ul 3(F
1
(Hi(tI))) = Ji,(F'(t')), and
similarly, F'(Hi,(t)') = II 3(Fi(t')). Therefore,
Since there is only one buyer, we omit the superindex in his type. Assume the seller has
type to = (t0 , ti) = 0. The vector field
F-where h(z):= - , z E R,
soleshequ tii- iin (Tr et l pbz
solves the equation div Fi = fi in Ti. Therefore, the seller problem is
fk(H*(t)k) H k fk(tk)
I (F) max T, p(t) -(t + f(t)) t 1 (t)dt -J Q1Fi dS
s.t. p: Ti -+ E
Lemmas 2 and 5 imply that when (Si)-(S3) are satisfied, there is an optimal
solution p of (M) which is symmetric. If ((H,(t)) = Hl,,(t(t)) for all t E T and i # j,
and p(t) e argmaxqE ((t) - q, then clearly II, 3(p(t)) E argmaxG (fl,(t)) - q. Therefore,
problem (M) admits a symmetric solution p : T -+ E. The next proposition summarizes
the conditions for the relaxation procedure proposed in Section 4.
PROPOSITION 6: Suppose (S,)-(S3) hold, and let F
1 
be such that divF1 = fi
and F1 (H(t 1)) = ll(F(t 1 )) for all ti E T1 and ir E c4. Define F'(t')) := F1(Hi(t')),
t' E T;, and
(=t + (t'+ f(t) t ET.
Let p be symmetric and such that p(t) E arg max {f(t) - q j q E E } for each t E T.
Consider the auction mechanism (p, y,p), where p = 0, pj = (N - 1)-i for all j $ i, and
yi(t') := q'(t') - t' - Q;(t') - b,, t' E T;. Suppose that
(1) ffQ 1 F
1 
-dS=0, and
(2) q' is conservative and monotone for each i.
Then (p, y, p) is an optimal auction mechanism.
6. EXAMPLES
EXAMPLE 1: As mentioned above, the techniques developed in this paper can be
adapted to deal with the case in which the buyers'types have an additional coordinate to
represent the externality they suffer when the seller keeps the object. We consider here an
example with just one buyer whose type t = (to, t1) is distributed in T, := (-oo,0] x [0, oo)
with density
fl(t) := Ae-A(,-to),
p is a monotone and conservative field.
Since player 1 is the only buyer, his conditional expected probability assignment
function coincides with p (that is, ql= p), and since q(t) E E for all t E Ti,
|it15 p(zt) - ti dz <_ ti - to, for all t E Ti.
The vector field F1 has a singularity at the origin, and Ti is unbounded. However, we
can show that the the second term in the seller's objective function (involving the integral
over the boundary 8T1) is equal to 0. Let T, (k) be the subset of Ti contained between the
lines L1/k and Lk, where L, := {t ETIti -to =z}, z >0. We have
QIFI-dS= lim QiFi-dS.
The boundary OT, (k) is made of four line segments: L1/k, Lk, the "vertical" line {(0, ti)I
- t < k-}, and the "horizontal" line {(to,0) - k < to -}}. The unitary exterior
normal vector for each segment is, respectively,
} 1O 1i) (f),1 and (2).
The vector field F
1 is perpendicular to the exterior normal on the horizontal and vertical





lim QiFI -dS <lim 1+ - e-A/k + k(1+ Ak)e'-A = 0.k-+ a21-ook k
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This example is representative: in our model of Section 2 with N buyers, when
a1 = +oo and bo = -oo, it is always possible to find a solution of div F
1 
= fi such that
F
1 
- n = 0 at the boundary of T1. As we pointed out in Section 4, such a solution will
have singularities on OT. As it is done in this example, it is enough to place just one
singularity at the origin. If the sigularity is such that
lim z2 max {||F1 (O1 + t1)II I ti - (t2+... + tN) = z) = 0,
then for any p : T -* E, f", QF -dS = 0.
Define -y(z) := 1 + h(z) = tA ,jg~, and E(t) := y(ti - to)fi(t)t. Then, the
seller's objective function is
/(t) -p(t)dt
The function y : R4 -4 R is increasing, concave, and has a root at z* := 2 . Therefore,
the optimal solution of problem (R) (problem (P) with the last two constraints relaxed) is
(t) (1,0) if ti -to < z*
P"t _ (0,1) if ti - to > z*.
It is easy to see that this is a conservative and monotone vector field, and hence it is also
the solution of problem (P). One can also verify that y(t) = z* for ti - to 2 z*, and
y(t) = 0 otherwise. The solution represents a "take-it-or-leave-it" offer by the seller at
price z*. The buyer accepts the offer if his type t is such that t - to > z*; otherwise the
seller keeps the object.
The change of variables r = t, - to would allow us to solve this example using
the existing techniques for one-dimensional mechanism design problems. Our result then
replicates an example of Myerson (1981), showing that the optimal auction in this case is
a modified Vickrey auction, in which the seller submits a bid ro = z*. Of course, this is
possible only in problems with just one buyer.
EXAMPLE 2: Now consider the standard problem of this paper with two buyers,
where T1 = [0,00) x (-00, 0], T2 = (-00, 0] x [0,00), f,(t1) = A
2 exp{-A(ti - t2)}, and
f2(t
2) = 2 exp{-A(t2 - ti)}. Also, suppose t = 0. This is a symmetric setting.
From Example 1 we have that
F' (ti) : h(tl - t') f,(t')) , tileT,
and F2 (t 2 )= F1(1112(t2)), t 2 E T, solve divFi = fI, i = 1,2. The same argument above




Therefore, the seller's objective function is
j((t) - p(t)dt,
where ((t) := y(ti - t2)t1 + y(t -t?)t 2.
We focus again on the relaxed problem. The function p : T -+ E that maximizes
((t) . p(t) for each t E T is given by
(0,0) if ( 1(t) < 0 and E2(t) < 0
p(t) = (1,0) if ti(t) > 0 and (,(t) > (2(t)
(0,1) if t2(t) 0 and ti(t) < C2(t).
Clearly, if s1 = t1 + ae for some a E R, then y(si - s2) = y(ti - t2). Therefore, if (t 1,t 2)
solves (1(t) = (2 (t) (that is, if ti'y(ti - t)+ tiy(t - ti) = ty(til -ti) + t y(tz - ti)), so
does (ti + ae,t2) and (t1,t2 + ae). Moreover, if t2 - 1112(t1) = (t2, ti), then (t1,t 2 ) also
solves 41(t) = E2(t). Therefore, the set of t E T that solve ti (t) = t2(t) is the intersection
of T with the hyperplane H generated by the vectors
1 0 1
0 ' 1 , and 0 '
0 1 1
Since (1, -i,1,-1) is perpendicular to H, H is also described by the equation
il- t2 + t t=0 or ti-t2=t22-t .
Thus, the solution of the relaxed problem is given by
0, 0) if tiy(ti -t2) + t y(t - ti) < 0 and fly(tI - ti) + t y(t - ti) < 0
P(t) = (1,0) if t y(tl - ti) + ti (t4 - ti) 2 0 and ti - t2 > t2 - ti
(0,1) - if t(ti - t2) +t27(t - ti) > 0 and t - t2 < t2 - ti.
To verify whether the corresponding functions q
1 and q2 are conservative and
monotone is a formidable task. We don't attempt this here. In a subsequent paper we
expect to give a more general characterization of the functions p : T -t E that produce a
monotone and conservative vector field q for each i = 1,... , N. However, this example
23
suggests that in contrast with the private and independent values standard auction, the
solution cannot be viewed as a modified Vickrey aution with a reservation price. Instead
of inducing the buyers to raise their bids by the threat of keeping the object if their bids
are too low, here the seller produces similar incentives by pitching the buyers against each
other. Note that (t1,t 2) = ((a, -a), (-a, a)) satisfies 61(t) = 0 and fa(t) = 0 for all a > 0.
Hence, no matter how small they are, when the reports of the buyers are on this ray, the
seller never keeps the object.
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